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Before embracing solar rooftops as a model for the United 
States, let’s look at California’s experience. Our report 
card looks not only at the costs and benefits to the solar 
adopters, but also to the investor-owned electric utilities, 
to the government, and especially to the environment 
from lower carbon emissions. What glistens is not gold.  
Since 2000 in California, 
electricity generation from 
solar rooftops has grown at 
an annual rate of 32%. By 
2017, it accounted for 12.5% 
of residential electricity pro-
duction.1 Policy makers can 
point to that growth with self
-congratulation for having 
adopted generous tax credits 
both at the federal and state 
level. Without tax credits, 
most residential users would 
have found it too expensive 
to adopt solar. Even though 
the cost of solar panels has 
fallen steeply over the last 
decade,2 without tax credits 
the electricity savings from 
rooftop solar would never 
come close to paying for it-
self.  
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
A+ Widespread Adoption of 
Rooftop Solar  
 
D High Cost per Carbon 
Tons Abated 
 
D An Unintended Tax on 
the Poor 
 
F Cheaper Ways to do the 
Same Thing 
2 Using information from a paper by Universi-
ty of California Berkeley economist Severin 
Borenstein3 and industry sources, we calcu-
lated how much a typical high consumption 
residence in 2010 would spend on a rooftop 
solar system based on the fixed cost of the 
equipment, tax credits, and monthly solar 
savings. Without tax credits, that residence 
would have to pay $73,680 for the installa-
tion, and over the subsequent 25-year life of 
the solar panels would save only $44,050 on 
its electricity bills, leaving a net cost of 
$29,630. Policy makers understood the pow-
er of tax credits to fundamentally change 
that calculus. With the federal solar tax cred-
it of 30% plus a California tax credit worth 
about two-thirds as much,4 that same hypo-
thetical residence (shown in Table 1) would 
discover with the combined tax credits of 
$36,830, that its out of pocket cost would be 
reduced from a negative $29,630 to a posi-
tive $7,200! However, before we heap too 
much praise on this policy maybe we should 
grade it by the economists’ metric of costs 
and benefits to all of the parties involved.  
AN EXPENSIVE WAY TO ABATE CO2 
Looking beyond the small benefit to the so-
lar adopter, we must recognize that govern-
ment revenues decreased by the amount of 
the tax credits ($36,830). These reduced tax 
revenues in turn have an opportunity cost 
because they crowd out other useful public 
expenditures. Less obvious are the costs so-
lar adopters impose on electricity providers. 
In California, residential customers only pay 
for the electricity delivered to them, so elec-
tricity cost savings to solar adopters are a 
lost revenue to the electric utilities. Obviously, 
electric utilities will not have to purchase 
the electricity from the wholesale grid that 
solar displaced, but that is only about a 
quarter of the lost revenue. The local distri-
bution network must still be maintained so 
when solar households wish to turn on ap-
pliances at night or on cloudy days, the net-
work will be there to provide service.  
The problem is further compounded by the 
fact that California regulators impose in-
creasing block tariffs, meaning that the big-
gest users pay marginal prices almost four 
times the price paid by the lowest users. 
High consumption users (paying the highest 
marginal prices) are the ones most incentiv-
ized to adopt solar. By adopting solar, they 
can move out of the high price blocks into 
the low price blocks that typically lower in-
come, lower consumption users pay. So, for 
the electricity providers, the increasing 
block tariffs exacerbate their losses. Our hy-
pothetical solar adopter reduced electricity 
purchases by 60% annually. Even after sub-
tracting the cost for the power displaced by 
the solar generation, the electric utility still 
faced a revenue shortfall of $35,700 (see 
Table 1). Paradoxically, as we shall see later, 
those costs were passed along to the less 
affluent, non-solar adopters. 
What are the environmental benefits in 
terms of reduced carbon dioxide (CO2) emis-
sions to the atmosphere? For our hypothet-
ical solar adopter, the annual reduction in 
kWh generated was 8,340 kWh which trans-
lates into 2.77 tons less carbon annually 
than if a combined cycle natural gas plant 
had produced the electricity.5 Over the 25-
year life of the rooftop solar system, that 
amounts to 69.4 tons less CO2. Putting a 
price on a ton of CO2 has led to a vast eco-
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nomic literature with no consensus. One 
widely cited paper reports a central value for 
the social cost of carbon of $21/ton.6 The En-
ergy Information Agency (EIA) places it at 
$37/ton of CO2. To be conservative, we used 
the higher EIA estimate, resulting in a $2,570 
benefit to the environment. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, summing the costs and benefits to con-
sumers, electric utilities, government, and 
the environment results in a net loss of 
$62,580. To pass a cost/benefit test, the envi-
ronmental cost of a ton of CO2 would have to 
be almost twenty-four times larger. In sum, 
solar rooftops are a very costly method to 
achieve modest environmental benefits. 
The basic calculations reported in Table 1 
make no allowance for discounting—in effect 
assuming that a dollar’s worth of savings 25 
years from now are equivalent to a dollar 
savings today. Table 1 also shows the same 
calculations assuming a 4% discount rate and 
constant 2010 dollars to account for infla-
tion.7 Discounting makes the value of future 
savings from reduced electricity bills even 
smaller, thus making the decision to switch 
to solar even less attractive. In essence, the 
policy conclusion is the same. Rooftop solar 
tax incentives are an extremely inefficient 
way to reduce carbon emissions. 
AN UNINTENDED TAX ON THE POOR 
Let’s go back to the cost borne by the elec-
tric utilities. Who pays for this? The stock-
holders in the electric utilities or the rate 
payers served by the electric utilities? Be-
cause the electric utilities are publicly regu-
lated and investors are guaranteed a fair 
return on their capital, they pass these costs 
along to consumers. The costs cannot be 
avoided because the distribution system 
must still be maintained for solar customers 
who will continue to use the grid intermit-
tently. Frank Wolak, an economics professor 
at Stanford, has found that over the period 
2003 to 2016, average electricity distribu-
tion charges doubled. Of this approximate 4 
cents per kWh increase, he calculates that 
two-thirds is attributable to the distributed 
solar customers’ reduced consumption.8 Ob-
viously, policy makers did not contemplate 
this unintended effect.  
CHEAPER WAYS TO DO SAME THING 
While policy makers were well intentioned, 
their zeal for picking winners and losers has 
led to a very costly program with relatively 
small environmental benefits. Rooftop solar 
is only one example. Others include tax cred-
its for electric vehicles, ethanol mandates for 
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Solar 
Adopter 
Electricity 
Provider 
Government 
Environ-
ment 
Net Benefit 
(over 25 years) 
No Discounting      
No Tax Credit –$29,630 –$35,700 $0 +$2,750 –$62,580 
With Tax Credit +$7,200 –$35,700 –$36,830 +$2,750 –$62,580 
4% Discounting      
No Tax Credit –$45,030 –$23,210 $0 +$1,670 –$66,570 
With Tax Credit –$8,200 –$23,210 –$36,830 +$1,670 –$66,570 
Table 1: Costs and Benefits for a Hypothetical High Consumption Solar Adopter in California  
gasoline, CAFE  limits on auto efficiency, and 
the list goes on. With such a dismal track 
record, Congress should get out of the busi-
ness of picking future technologies to reduce 
carbon. However, that does not mean that 
policy makers should do nothing about the 
climate change problem. The problem is re-
al, and barring some major technological 
advance, not likely to go away.  
The most cost effective method of dealing 
with our CO2 problem is to put a bounty on it 
in the form of a carbon tax and let the mar-
ket find the cheapest ways to reduce carbon. 
The beauty of a carbon tax is that by increas-
ing the price of fossil fuel energy, it will un-
leash innovations by both producers and 
consumers to find cost-effective means of 
reducing emissions. A carbon tax will allow 
the market to sort through new technologies 
in a cost-effective way. By anointing certain 
technologies as winners, like rooftop solar, 
we crowd out other alternatives.9  
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of Global Markets, Energy in a Global Economy, and Governance and Public Services–our objective is to advance the 
design of policies for tomorrow’s challenges. 
Contact: 
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Mosbacher Institute for Trade, Economics, and Public Policy  
Bush School of Government and Public Service 
4220 TAMU, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 77843-4220 
Email: bushschoolmosbacher@tamu.edu  
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The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Mosbacher Institute, a center for 
independent, nonpartisan academic and policy research, nor of the Bush School of Government and Public Service.  
To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
http://bit.ly/1ABajdH  
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Chair Emeritus at the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service. 
Robert Joseph Ladmirault Jr. is pursuing a 
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production. See https://www.energy.ca.gov/almanac/electricity_data/
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